NO CALLING CUT: THE POLITICAL RIGHT TO RECORD
POLICE
Elizabeth J. Frawley
On February 15, 2014, Shawn Thomas witnessed and began recording New York Police Officer Efrain Rojas making an arrest at a
1
subway station. All indications show that Thomas was a safe distance
away, approximately thirty feet, when Rojas retaliated by video re2
cording Thomas. Rojas approached Thomas, shoving his camera in
3
Thomas’s face, and the two began arguing. Thomas eventually accused Rojas of invading his personal space; Rojas accused Thomas of
4
5
the same thing. A sudden skip in the video occurred. The next im6
age was of Rojas and presumably Shawn Thomas outside. Rojas was
7
pressing Thomas against the snow-covered ground. A third person
8
had taken over the camera, recording Rojas as he arrested Thomas.
Thomas was charged with resisting arrest, trespassing, disorderly
9
conduct, and obstructing government.
Thomas’s story is not, at its core, unusual. A quick internet search
can provide numerous videos of police officers aggressively approaching civilians who happen to record the officers in the course of their
10
Officers’ reactions range from the one seen in
public duties.
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See, e.g., Copwatch News, Kentucky Cops Detain Man for “Suspicion of Terrorist Activity” for Video Recording Police Station, YOUTUBE (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_
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Thomas’s case, ultimately leading to the recorder’s arrest, to simply
approaching the civilian recorder and inquiring as to what he or she
was doing and why.
Arrests of civilian recorders are by no means unusual. Cases surrounding civilian recorders being arrested and charged with viola11
12
13
tions of privacy, harassment, or wiretapping statutes have begun
peppering the district courts and even reaching the circuit courts.
Over the past decade, four circuits have decided cases in which a civilian recorder was arrested or forced to cease recording. The recorders, believing this to be a violation of their First Amendment rights,
14
filed claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The decisions collectively
indicate that there is a firmly established First Amendment right to
record police officers, but that courts are only starting to address the
Fourth Amendment concerns. While the recorder does have a First
Amendment right to record, the right overlaps with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence dictating the reactions permissible by law enforcement officers. In addition, the right to record cannot be so limitless as to allow recorders to directly interfere with law enforcement.
This Comment will explore the First Amendment rights of the civilian recorder, taking into consideration reasonable limitations and
police officer reactions. Part I considers the current circuit decisions
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va1ioLMxFQ at 0:50–1:15, 4:15-4:50 (depicting an officer explain that taking photographs
or pictures of a police building is a suspicious activity relating to terrorist activities and
creates fear for an officer’s safety); Jay Kelly, Harassed by Boston Police for Taking Video,
YOUTUBE (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zaF2u9G-jXE (showing
Boston Police officers harassing a recorder for endangering a plainclothes police officer
and interfering with an investigation despite other civilians being allowed to walk nearby); Digby Jones, California Deputy Detains Man for Video Recording Arrest, Accusing Him of
Possbly Plotting Murder, YOUTUBE (June 13, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=pk0
jjs-VUyQ (showing an officer approaching a bystander, detaining him, and asking for ID
for recording an arrest); stopthenewworldorder_now.com, Police Harass Children for Filming Police, YOUTUBE (May 22, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H0KNRiliVDM
(seemingly depicting an officer forcibly removing a camera phone from an individual).
See, e.g., Johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2004) (refusing to grant an officer
qualified immunity for arresting an individual under the State of Washington’s Privacy
Act).
See, e.g., Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 538–40 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (reviewing
the previous conviction of a man for harassment after he videorecorded Pennsylvania
state troopers, whom the man believed were inspecting trucks in an unsafe manner).
See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011) (discussing a Massachusetts
man’s arrest for violating state wiretap statutes after videorecording Boston police officers
making an arrest); Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 964 (Mass. 2001) (discussing
a citizen’s arrest for video recording that occurred during a traffic stop).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides for a civil right of action when an individual acting under the
color of the law deprives a citizen or person within the jurisdiction of the United States of
his Constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
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surrounding Right to Record cases and examines a balanced approach between viewpoints. Part II examines the First Amendment
right to record as part of a right to gather public information. Part
III examines realistic limitations and concerns surrounding the right
to record, including the intersection with the Fourth Amendment.
I. CURRENT CIRCUIT DECISIONS
The following part examines the current circuit court decisions
surrounding the right to record. As the public has become increasingly saturated by smart phones, and cameras record almost every aspect of our lives, courts have begun to address the First Amendment
concerns posed by arrests and limitations on the civilian video recording of police officers in the course of their public duties. At the
time of the drafting of this Comment, the First, Third, Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits have all faced the issue, each taking a slightly different approach in interpretation.
A. First Circuit – A Right to Record Matters of Public Interest
The First Circuit addressed the issue of the citizen-recorder in the
15
2011 case of Glik v. Cunniffe. The court was faced with a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 suit for violation of civil rights after Simon Glik, a Massachusetts
16
resident, was arrested and charged with wiretapping for video and
17
audio recording three police officers arresting a young man. Glik
recorded the interaction on his personal cell phone from about ten
feet away, not otherwise interacting with the officers. While the wiretapping charges were eventually dismissed, Glik believed the arrest
violated his First Amendment Rights.
The First Circuit found that “[t]he filming of government officials
engaged in their duties in a public place, including police officers
performing their responsibilities, fits comfortably within” the protected First Amendment principles of gathering and disseminating
18
information. In reaching its conclusion, the court looked to the
15
16

17
18

655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).
Id. at 80; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(C)(1) (2014) (“Except as otherwise specifically provided in this section any person who willfully commits an interception, attempts
to commit an interception, or procures any other person to commit an interception or to
attempt to commit an interception of any wire or oral communication shall be fined not
more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisoned in the state prison for not more than five
years, or imprisoned in a jail or house of correction for not more than two and one half
years, or both so fined and given one such imprisonment.”).
Glik, 655 F.3d at 79.
Id. at 82.
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rights of a citizen recorder and equated them with the rights of the
19
press. The First Circuit then looked to surrounding jurisdictions to
reach the conclusion that there was a First Amendment right to record the actions of police officers in public spaces, drawing heavily on
20
the importance of discourse pertaining to government affairs.
B. Third Circuit – Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
21
In Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, the Third Circuit addressed a quali22
fied immunity claim for officers who stopped Brian Kelly, a passen23
ger in a vehicle, from recording the routine traffic stop. Kelly habitually carried a hand-held video camera and began recording a
24
Pennsylvania police officer, who had stopped the driver for speeding
25
and a bumper height violation. The police officer asked Kelly to relinquish the camera, believing this to be a violation of wiretapping
26
statutes. Kelly complied. After consulting with a district attorney,
27
the officer arrested Kelly for violating Pennsylvania’s Wiretap Act.
28
The officer asked for bail and held Kelly in prison for 27 hours.
Charges were eventually dropped, but Kelly pursued a § 1983 suit alleging the police officers violated his First Amendment right to record and Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest lacking in
29
probable cause.

19
20
21
22

23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Id. at 83.
Id. at 83–84.
622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010).
An individual who is facing a § 1983 suit for violation of rights can claim qualified immunity as a defense. Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability
when their conduct does not clearly violate a Constitutional right. If there was no constitutional right, or if the right was not clearly established at the time of the violation, the
government official is freed from liability and any resulting damages. See Anderson v.
Creighton, 438 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (noting that the defense arose out of “conflicting
concerns” for, on the one hand, a victim’s right to meaningful relief and for, on the other, the societal costs of allowing damage suits against public officials); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982) (noting at the outset of its analysis that the Court’s “decisions consistently have held that government officials are entitled to some form of
immunity from suits for damages”).
Kelly, 622 F.3d at 251–52.
There is some dispute about whether the camera was in plain sight the entire time. Id. at
251. This dispute is immaterial to the First Amendment question.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 251–52; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5701–5782.
Kelly, 622 F.3d at 252.
Id.
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The Third Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary
30
judgment for the police officer based on qualified immunity. In examining whether there was Fourth Amendment probable cause to arrest under the wiretapping statute, the court considered whether the
officer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his actions with
31
Kelly, making it a private conversation. The court vacated the officer’s summary judgment with respect to qualified immunity, re32
manding for additional fact-finding.
The Third Circuit also reviewed the First Amendment claim,
33
which the district court dismissed as not clearly established. Looking to the surrounding circuit court decisions, the Third Circuit noted the right to record matters of public concern is still subject to the
34
limitations of reasonable time, place and manner. In a previous
Third Circuit decision, Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of West White35
land, reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions led the court
to allow the prohibition of video recording town hall meetings, because the act of gathering information in the context of the First
Amendment allowed note-taking as a reasonable manner restriction
36
as opposed to video recording. Due to the Whiteland Woods deci37
sion, amongst others, the Third Circuit found that the right to record was not clearly established, upholding the grant of qualified im38
munity on the First Amendment issue.

30
31

32
33
34

35
36
37
38

Id.
Id. at 258. The Court considered the expectation of privacy not as a part of the First
Amendment issue, but based on the language of the statute. The Wiretapping statute only prohibits the interception of oral communications possessing an expectation that the
communication not be intercepted. See id. at 257; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5702–03.
Kelly, 622 F.3d at 259.
Id.
Id. at 262. Time, place, and manner restrictions are common First Amendment limitations. Those engaged in conduct covered by the First Amendment can still be limited in
reasonable, content-neutral ways that dictate the time frame, location, and manner of
communication. This is discussed more in Part III, infra. See also Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“Our cases make clear . . . that even in a public forum
the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech . . . .”).
193 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 1999).
Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262.
Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177 (3rd. Cir. 1999)
Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262–263.
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C. The Ninth Circuit – No Clearly Established Interpretation of the State
Statute
The Ninth Circuit in 1995 offered a much more limited approach
when deciding Fordyce v. City of Seattle.39 Jerry Edmond Fordyce was
video recording a Seattle protest, including police officers and civil40
ian bystanders, for local television. After being arrested under Washington privacy statutes, which were later dismissed after a night in jail,
41
Fordyce filed a § 1983 civil rights claim. The district court granted
42
summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Circuit Court
rejected qualified immunity for the First Amendment claims, re43
manding them for trial. It then upheld a grant of qualified immunity for the arrest, basing its decision on the state law that prohibited
44
recording private conversations. The court found that, at the time
of arrest, it was not sufficiently clear if conversations in public consti45
The
tuted private conversations for the purpose of the statute.
Ninth Circuit therefore upheld the grant of qualified immunity with
respect to the arrest under the Fourth Amendment.
D. Eleventh Circuit – Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Smith v. City of Cumming upheld
a grant of summary judgment in favor of police officers who prevented James and Barbara Smith from video recording the officers in
46
public. The court stated:
As to the First Amendment claim under Section 1983, we agree with
the Smiths that they had a First Amendment right, subject to reasonable
time, manner and place restrictions, to photograph or videotape police
47
conduct.

Yet, the court found the police officers’ actions did not violate this
right, despite an allegation of police officers preventing video record48
ing.
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 438.
Id.
Id. at 438–39.
Id. at 439.
Id.
Id.
212 F.3d 1332, 1332–33. (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1333.
Id. at 1332–33. No additional factual information was provided to clarify how the officers
prevented the Smiths from recording. The Court provided no information to reconcile
the claim that the officers stopped the Smiths with the statement that the Smiths “have
not shown that the [officers’] actions violated that right.” Id.
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***
With the variations among courts, which approach should dominate, and what, if anything, can police officers do in response to civilian recording? The common theme amongst the courts is granting
of the right to record in limited circumstances. The exception to this
is the First Circuit, which used broad language and looked to the diminished privacy in public locations and the importance of the type
of speech. None of the courts have been willing to throw open the
police station doors to civilians with cameras in hand. Yet, the police
actions that occur on public streets are readily available for all to see.
Adding a video recorder only alters the calculus in that it creates an
arguably objective record of the events.
This approach recognizes that the public has a legitimate interest
in monitoring and observing the activities of police officers as government officials. It encompasses the First Circuit’s belief that there
is a right to record, but that the right extends only to public places, a
reasonable place restriction.
There is, however, also a legitimate interest in protecting officers
from violence and police investigations from intrusions stemming
from recorders. While these are common concerns, the balance rests
on allowing civilians to record officers performing their duties when
officers are in public and can be personally observed. There also
must be recognition that the legal activity of recording is not shielded
from reactions or from arousing suspicions of illegal activity in some
contexts. The act of video recording, although constitutionally protected, can be considered in the probable cause and reasonable suspicion analyses on behalf of the officers.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS OF POLITICAL SPEECH
The primary concern of the courts mentioned above in assessing
these cases has been Freedom of Speech and the Press. The First
Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
49
the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” Despite the two separate phrases for speech and press and a contentious debate among
50
academics, it has been determined that both provisions encompass
49
50

U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment was made applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 318 U.S. 105, 108 (1943).
Compare Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1027–28 (2011)
(arguing that treating freedom of the press and freedom of speech equally creates an impermissible redundancy in phrasing), with Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 462–
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the same general right to expression, with members of the press be51
ing awarded no greater rights than those of the public. The First
Amendment focus is well-founded and the primary concern that
should arise when discussing the suppression of video recording of
police officers and dissemination of information surrounding government actors. This part will discuss (a) the appropriate level of
scrutiny with this type of issue; (b) the right to gather information
under the First Amendment, specifically in the context of an overly
vague and often-ignored case; and (c) film as a specifically protected
medium of First Amendment activity. In conclusion, this part will
find that there is a right to record government officials as part of the
First Amendment.
A. Judicial Scrutiny of Speech Regulations and Police as Government Actors
Exacting scrutiny should be applied when considering limitations
to the right to record. It has been determined that the First Amendment “was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the peo52
ple.” The very core of this amendment is political speech, receiving
53
the strongest protections amongst the various categories of speech.
This rationale stems from the concept of a well-informed electorate

51

52

53

63 (2012) (arguing that the Framers considered the press to be a form of technology and
were attempting to “secur[e] the right of every person to use communications technology, and not just securing a right belonging exclusively to members of the publishing industry”).
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1978); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843,
850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833–34 (1974); Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns,
435 U.S. 589, 608–09 (1978).
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); see also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
101–02 (“The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. The exigencies of the
colonial period and the efforts to secure freedom from oppressive administration developed a broadened conception of these liberties as adequate to supply the public need for
information and education with respect to the significant issues of the times. . . . Freedom
of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues
about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to
cope with the exigencies of their period.”).
See Buckley v. Valeo, 42 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1976) (finding that financial contributions are a
form of political speech which is at the very core of the First Amendment); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (finding that a higher standard of intent is needed in
libel cases when the plaintiff is a public official because the First Amendment was designed to facilitate the dissemination of information about public officials); R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Our First Amendment decisions
have created a rough hierarchy in the constitutional protection of speech. Core political
speech occupies the highest, most protected position . . . .”).
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creating political accountability for those that allegedly serve them.54
While the formal law requires a strict scrutiny of content-based
55
speech restrictions, and intermediate scrutiny surrounding content56
neutral restrictions, the public interest in gauging government actions is so high and historically ingrained that even the review of content-neutral regulations of speech pertaining to government actors
can begin to look more like strict scrutiny and is sometimes referred
57
to as “exacting scrutiny.” For example, the Supreme Court requires
a higher standard of intent in libel suits brought for defamation of a
public figure’s character so as to not chill the conversation surround58
ing government and politics. While the law at issue in Sullivan was
content-neutral, the concern over free speech and government officials required heightened sensitivity. The stakes are simply higher
when pertaining to government actions and actors, those very people
that are supposed to be acting on the citizen’s behalf and with their
consent.
The restrictions on the right to record, like the libel statutes, are
content neutral but also encompass the political speech that the First

54

55

56
57

58

This idea has been foreshadowed in Justice Powell’s dissent in Saxbe:
What is at stake here is the societal function of the First Amendment in preserving
free public discussion of governmental affairs. No aspect of that constitutional
guarantee is more rightly treasured than its protection of the ability of our people
through free and open debate to consider and resolve their own destiny. . . . “[The] First Amendment is one of the vital bulwarks of our national commitment to intelligent self-government.” It embodies our Nation’s commitment
to popular self-determination and our abiding faith that the surest course for developing sound national policy lies in a free exchange of views on public issues.
And public debate must not only be unfettered; it must also be informed. For that
reason this Court has repeatedly stated that First Amendment concerns encompass
the receipt of information and ideas as well as the right of free expression.
417 U.S. at 862–63 (Powell, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). See also Stromberg
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (“The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people
and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.”).
See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014) (stating that restrictions that are not
content neutral “must satisfy strict scrutiny—that is, it must be the least restrictive means
of achieving a compelling state interest”); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 653–55 (1994) (describing the level of scrutiny as “strict” for any conferred benefit
or punishment based on the content of a message) (citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1
(1986)).
See Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642 (“[R]egulations that are unrelated to the content of
speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.”).
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (“When a law burdens
core political speech, we apply ‘exacting scrutiny,’ and we uphold the restriction only if it
is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.”).
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 268–69.
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Amendment strives to keep unfettered. Police officers possess an
59
immense amount of power and an immense potential for abuse.
They are the government actors we are most likely to encounter, and
that proximity creates a desire for close monitoring and accountability worthy of the highest level of judicial scrutiny—exacting scrutiny
under which the law can only stand when it is narrowly tailored for an
important government interest.
B. The Right to Gather Information as Part of the First Amendment
The First Amendment Freedom of Speech and the Press, in the
case of the civilian recorder and most other political communication,
would be hollow if there was no implicit right to gather information.
In recognition of this, the Supreme Court has found within the First
Amendment a right to access, receive, and gather information. This
60
“structural model” protects the First Amendment by protecting
those seeking out news, and ensuring that they are not arbitrarily cut
61
off from normally accessible information. This right to gather is by
62
no means absolute, yet “[t]here is an undoubted right to gather
63
news ‘from any source by means within the law.’”
Within the context of the First Amendment right to record, this
presents no unique problem to the citizen recorder. Surely the recorder has a right to use his or her sense of sight and to access public
64
places. While the recorder would not have the right to request en59

60

61

62

63
64

See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 453, 455–56 (2004) (explaining that the “distinctive and influential organizational
culture” of police offices “bears significant responsibility for police misbehavior”).
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“But the First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free expression and communicative interchange for their own sakes, it has a structural role to play in
securing and fostering our republican system of self-government.”).
See id. at 576–77 (finding a right to gather information at criminal trials should be protected from arbitrary foreclosure because they were historically open to the public);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (“We do not question the significance of
free speech, press, or assembly to the country’s welfare. Nor is it suggested that news
gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”).
See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1978) (finding that there is no right to
access all sources of information within government control, specifically within secure
prison systems); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (upholding a ban on passports to Cuba,
because national safety is of greater importance than the gathering of information firsthand).
Houchins, 438 U.S. at 11 (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681–82).
In fact, a whole range of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence exists on this assumption,
allowing officers to make warrantless arrests in public, and seize evidence in plain view.
Limiting the public access to see and document this information would then have to cre-
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trance to police files and offices, the recorder would be allowed to
gather the information projected to the public and readily accessible
for all to see. Yet, problems exist in (1) the right to observe arrests
and (2) the right to gather information through a specific type of
medium: film.
1. The Often-Ignored Problem of Colten: No Right to Observe Without
Something More
Particularly important within the Right to Record and gathering
information context is a case seemingly forgotten by recent Circuit
65
Court decisions: Colten v. Kentucky. The case has thus far been ignored by the circuit courts, but explicitly rejected a First Amendment
66
right to observe police actions. If there is no right to visually observe an arrest as police activity, then there would likely be no right to
video record either.
In Colten, one car amongst a procession of vehicles was pulled over
67
for a legal traffic stop. Drivers following, including Colten, pulled
68
off the highway, many leaving their cars. The large gathering of cars
caused additional officers to stop, blocking one lane of the highway
69
and causing traffic to back up. Colten approached the initial officer
several times to arrange for transportation of passengers and watch
70
the officer; he was asked to return to his car and leave the scene.
When Colten remained, he was charged with disorderly conduct for
“congregat[ing] with other persons in a public place and refus[ing]
to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse” while intend71
ing to cause a public inconvenience. In a challenge to his charges,
Colten claimed that he was engaged in the First Amendment activities
of disseminating and receiving information relating to the issuance of
72
a traffic citation. The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, finding that the officers had a legitimate interest in enforcing traffic laws
and were reasonably worried that the procession of cars on the side

65
66

67
68
69
70
71
72

ate a limitation in the actions of police officers, who only derive their rights to act on and
consider evidence based on a known lack of privacy.
407 U.S. 104 (1972).
Id. at 109 (noting that the arrangement for transportation and observation of the issuance of a traffic citation was not disseminating or receiving information, and therefore
was not under the protection of the First Amendment).
Id. at 106.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 106–07.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 109.

298

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17:1

would be a danger to those parked and to other motorists. Therefore, the argument was a “strained, near-frivolous contention” and
the conduct “was not, without more, protected by the First Amend73
ment.”
Colten, when read too narrowly, seems to create a limitation for
the Right to Record advocates, but can easily be explained in the context of the prevailing Right to Record decisions. When examining
the facts, Colten aligns most clearly with the reasonable time, place,
and manner rationalization of the Eleventh Circuit. Impeding the
flow of traffic and interfering with the officer’s issuing of a citation is
not a reasonable manner of observing an arrest. Yet, it was the very
74
act of observing that Colten did not have a right to “without more.”
Colten can fit within the prevailing Right to Record decisions if (a) it
declares that the right to observe is not absolute and is subject to reasonable limitations; or (b) an individual has no right to observe, but
the act of recording is the something “more” that the Court needed
to find First Amendment protection.
a. Colten Dealt with the Unique Situation of an Observer Actually
Obstructing an Officer From the Performance of His or Her Duties
One possible explanation of Colten in the right to gather information and Right to Record context is that the court was less clear on
this issue than we now wish they were or was engaged in some faulty
reasoning. Colten’s observance of the arrest was not the issue. Instead, the issue was doing so on a public highway and with a sufficient
number of people as to limit the use of the road. The courts have
“consistently recognized the strong interest of state and local governments in regulating the use of their streets and other public plac75
es.” Even in the infamous case of Martin Luther King Jr.’s civil
rights marches in Birmingham, the Supreme Court recognized the
need to monitor highways with reasonable regulations:
Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the
safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has
never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one

73
74
75

Id.
Id.
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967).
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of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately
76
depend.

Very similarly, Colten’s valid interest in gathering information under
the First Amendment did not create unbridled access at the cost of
reasonable safety and transportation regulations. Colten had a right
to be in a publicly accessible place, and he clearly had a right to use
his senses and see what was occurring around him. However, Colten
could not exercise his First Amendment rights in any way he so desired. His rights remained subject to a larger body of law governing
time, place, and manner.
When understood as a case balancing First Amendment rights
with public safety, Colten seems more reasonably adapted within the
circuit court decisions. Civilians have a right to record, but no right
is absolute and shielded from inconveniences. The Eleventh Circuit,
although not abundantly clear in the acceptable limitations, correctly
identified that speech is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. For Colten, his manner was blocking the flow of traffic and creating a risk of an accident while engaging the officer in
conversation, ultimately distracting the officer from his legal actions.
It was not the observation that was the problem; it was the manner
Colten chose to observe.
b. Observation Does Not Merit First Amendment Protection, but the
Act of Recording is Additional Speech Activity Worthy of Protection
Colten can also be reconciled with current Right to Record decisions by claiming that the act of recording creates the higher level of
protection under the First Amendment. The Colten court stated,
“Colten’s conduct in refusing to move on after being directed to do
77
so was not, without more, protected by the First Amendment.” Colten’s reasoning for not moving was based on a desire to arrange
transportation and observe the issuance of a citation, seemingly insufficient under the first amendment “without more.”
When attempting to reconcile this with current Right to Record
decisions, it is possible that the act of recording constitutes the something “more” to which the court referred. This approach has received at least some support. Mario Cerame, in considering Colten in
the context of recording officers in Connecticut, believes that the
critical difference may be the presence of a device that can capture

76
77

Id. at 316 (citing Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941)).
Colten, 407 U.S. at 109.
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and publish the events.78 Respectfully, the observation could have just
as easily been written in a newspaper article or a book, presented at a
defense hearing, or orally repeated to others at a later time, and it
would have been equally protected under the First Amendment but
only required visual observation like that in Colten. It is hard to imagine that the gathering of information for a book or newspaper, which
may only require observation as opposed to video, would receive different levels of protection.
As discussed in the part immediately below, an individual’s choice
in how to gather information is an additional First Amendment issue
of concern in Right to Record cases.
c. Choice of Information-Gathering Medium as a First Amendment
Issue: The Right to Film over Simple Observation
Once it is accepted that individuals have a right to use their biological senses to gather information openly accessible to all through
every day observation, the right to do so by means of video recording
must be addressed. The act of recording is, in itself, expressive activity protected under the First Amendment. While the act of taking a
video may be seen as non-expressive physical act of simply standing
79
and holding a camera, the video being produced conveys a message.
In Right to Record cases, it is a political message.
Film, either moving or still, has previously been recognized as a
protected First Amendment medium, even in the most unlikely of
80
cases. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court struck
down a blanket ban on sexually explicit images that appeared to depict children, although they were generated without the use of and
81
harm to children. In discussing the issue of depicting children in
sexual scenarios, the court implicitly endorsed the movies “Traffic”
and “American Beauty” as within the realm of First Amendment

78
79

80
81

Mario Cerame, The Right to Record Police in Connecticut, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 385, 412
(2012).
See Cerame, supra note 78, at 414–15 (“The subject, the frame, the angle, the lighting, the
distance are all intrinsic to the value of the piece, and they are part of on-the-fly editorial
control that the citizen-recorder exercises. Imperfections in this chosen medium—the
blurriness, the rough audio, the shaky camera—add to the work’s authenticity. The medium itself, often coarse and everyday, enhances the speaker’s message criticizing the establishment. Inasmuch as any of these are incidental, they are part of the overall artistic
choice of medium by the recorder, like Pollock’s paint splashes or Banksy’s street art
stencils.”).
535 U.S. 234 (2002).
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 234.
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speech.82 The videos were considered to be artistically significant and
worthy of First Amendment protection that a blanket ban did not
83
consider. Video therefore acts as a protected media of expression.
That, naturally, does not mean that it can be produced in whatever
way desirable, without regard for other laws; it simply means that
what is being produced while recording has a First Amendment protection.
More specifically in Right to Record cases, there is a need to consider the choice between types of expressive mediums. When the
Third Circuit decided to grant qualified immunity in Kelly v. Borough
84
of Carlisle, it noted that it would be a reasonable restriction to permit
note-taking as opposed to video recording, seemingly implying that it
may be permissible to ban video recording because some alternative
in the form of written or oral communications exist. Yet, there is a
fundamental difference in video as a medium as opposed to other alternatives. At the heart of most civilian-police interactions brought
85
into court lie intense factual disputes. Yet, video acts to resolve the86
se disputes, providing an objective representation of events. This
objectivity that occurs with video has been noted as a value not only
to the civilian recorder, but also to police officers and departments

82
83
84
85

86

Id. at 247–48.
Id.
Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010).
Cf. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (considering the justification for use of deadly
force in a video recorded high-speed car chase given two vastly differing versions of the
same event); Matthew D. Thurlow, Lights, Camera, Action: Video Cameras As Tools of Justice,
23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 771, 808 (2005) (finding that an objective video
record “eliminates the need for a ‘swearing contest’ in which officers and suspects present vastly different stories about what happened”).
See Scott, 550 U.S. at 372 (finding no factual dispute when the video clearly contradicted
one version of events); Thurlow, supra note 85, at 808 (finding that an objective video
record “eliminates the need for a ‘swearing contest’ in which officers and suspects present vastly different stories about what happened”); Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 607 (2009) (claiming that videos alter the scope of Section 1983 suits and provide “truthful, unbiased,
objective, and unambiguous reproduction[s] of reality, deserving of controlling and dispositive weight”); Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory,
Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 344 (2011) (“Images, unlike
words, do not demand great literary ability, or even literacy, for persuasiveness; they provide apparently robust verification that does not depend on the reputation of the proponent.”).
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that have adopted mandatory recording procedures87 of interactions
88
with civilians.
Videos possess a certain credibility because the viewer is seeing it
as if it were the first time, rather than trusting an individual with his
own viewpoints, biases, and interests, which might influence the viewer’s interpretations. Writing and jotting down notes does not provide
the same objective viewpoint. Notes are easily altered or phrased in a
specific way to invoke an emotional response whereas video displays
what was within the frame and allows for personal interpretations and
89
conclusions.
Further problems can be seen with the Third Circuit’s “manner”
restrictions on recording by noting that simply because there is an alternative does not make a ban on one form reasonable. Requiring
video to be forgone for less-reliable note taking requires the adoption
of a less-credible method of documentation, particularly when there
is a notable credibility variation between police officers and those
90
they interact with, and it is rarely a reasonable limitation. In many
situations, those interacting with police might not be able to capture
events that happen faster than one can write. Alternatively, if the
proposed recorder is the one interacting with the police, it becomes
increasingly difficult to comply with police orders, such as putting
hands behind one’s back, in the air, or producing a license while
continuing to capture the events.
The availability of the alternative is influential, but not dispositive.
Simply looking to alternative forms of expression would allow bans
on whole categories of expressive, artistic mediums. It would be
permissible to eliminate all movies, as books can tell stories just as
well. Yet, we find variations between text and images, both with value
but in different ways.
87
88

89

90

Thurlow, supra note 85, at 772–75 (discussing the expansion of court-ordered and legislatively mandated police recording between 2004 and 2005).
Wasserman, supra note 86, at 614 (noting that the recording of police officers protects
against misrepresentations in civil rights suits against the police department and police
misconduct more generally); Thurlow, supra note 85, at 810–12 (2005) (noting that police and prosecutors receive the greatest advantages from recording by allowing officers
to refrain from taking notes, use the videos in training new recruits, and deter defendants
from filing unmeritorious suppression claims).
Cf. Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 838 (2009)
(finding that various people will interpret an objective video in different ways based on
their cultural background, and that these variations in interpretation would be reflected
in the recounting of the events).
See Cerame, supra note 78, at 396 (noting that courts and juries are more likely to believe
police officer testimony as credible).
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For these reasons, video holds a unique value compared to other
methods of gathering and disseminating information. Specific limitations allowing individuals to take notes on police actions in exchange for forgoing video recording cease to be reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions.
III. REASONABLE LIMITATIONS AND PERMISSIBLE RESPONSES: FOURTH
AMENDMENT INTERSECTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
While the First Amendment allows video recording police officers
as constitutionally protected activity, that does not mean that any
government reactions to it are inherently unconstitutional. While the
circuit court decisions involve police misconduct and claims of constitutional violations, they stem from the type of reaction as opposed to
the mere existence of a reaction. While the act of recording exists on
a spectrum of First Amendment activity, so do the permissible reactions of police officers.
While the First Amendment remains at the heart of the consideration of the courts’ decisions, there are additional implications for
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The Fourth Amendment, made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that the people are “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, . . . and
91
This
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”
amendment has been interpreted to allow various levels of police intrusion, ranging from brief questioning and frisking to full-blown
searches and arrests. Nearly every police interaction has the potential
to scare civilian recorders, even in a way that has the potential to chill
the valid speech occurring. However, the fear of chilling speech
cannot eliminate a whole array of Fourth Amendment law, nor
should it forbid officers from acting in reasonable ways.
The following parts examine the legality of reactions generally
permitted within the Fourth Amendment and some potential issues
that arise at the intersection of the First and Fourth Amendments.
A. Approaching a Recorder with No Further Actions
Police officers are granted the authority to randomly approach
any individual in a public place, ask them questions, and request con-

91

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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sent for further police conduct.92 As long as a reasonable person
would understand that he or she is free to choose not to engage with
the officer and refuse cooperation, there is no higher standard of
93
specificity or suspicion. The Fourth Amendment is not implicated
94
when the activity is non-coercive and consensual.
This remains applicable with the civilian-recorder of the police officer. There is nothing to stop an officer from approaching the civilian recorder and engaging her in questioning, as long as the totality
of the circumstances indicates to the recorder that he is in no way
forced to answer. The Fourth Amendment is not implicated in these
95
exchanges as they are considered to be consensual.
There is an argument that merely approaching an individual
could create a certain chill to the act of recording. It is also possible
that officers being recorded are more likely to approach and may
even intend to intimidate recorders with the hope that they desist
and that their speech is chilled. The same could be said for any activity the individual is engaged in when approached by an officer regardless of the legality of the actions. It therefore seems unlikely that
police would be forced to not acknowledge the presence of a camera
as opposed to approaching and inquiring without force or intimidation. If the recorder were to choose to not respond or state that they
do not wish to answer the questions, the officer would not be permit96
ted additional reaction or force. Just because the activity is legal and
constitutionally protected does not mean it must go unnoticed.
B. Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion: The Use of Protected Activity
as a Basis for Greater Intrusion
In order to conduct a full search or arrest, there must be probable
97
cause. The Supreme Court found this to require “only a probability
98
or substantial chance of criminal activity.” Establishing a threshold
92

93
94
95
96

97
98

See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431, 434 (1991) (acknowledging that “the Fourth
Amendment permits police officers in random airport lobbies and other public places to
ask [individuals] questions.”).
Id. at 431, 434.
Id. at 434.
Id.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983) (stating that “[t]he person approached . . . need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen
to the questions at all and may go on his way. He may not be detained even momentarily
without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer
does not, without more, furnish those grounds”) (internal citations omitted).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983).
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showing of probable cause allows the officer to arrest a person, conduct a search of that person incident to arrest, and occasionally permit for searches of areas such as cars where there is probable cause
99
that evidence does exist. In the alternative, officers are permitted to
conduct a “Terry” stop if the officer has reasonable suspicion that a
100
crime has occurred or is about to occur. This gives the officer per101
mission to briefly stop the individual to question him. If there were
to be suspicion that the individual was armed and dangerous, it
would allow the officer to conduct a brief frisk of the outside clothing
102
for weapons. In both standards, reasonable suspicion and probable
cause, innocent and completely legal behavior can and frequently
103
does provide the basis for intrusion upon the individual’s privacy.
These same standards are applicable against the civilian recorder.
In every Circuit Court case discussed in Part I, the officers arguably had probable cause that wiretapping statutes or privacy statutes
were violated through recording. In each case all of the charges were
dismissed. An officer needs probable cause to arrest or reasonable
suspicion to stop and frisk, but the question remains: “probable
cause of what?” If the First Amendment protections of Freedom of
Speech are to be taken seriously, then the mere act of recording a police officer while in a public place cannot constitute a crime, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion. A line must be drawn between
those “crimes” where the act of recording is the crime itself and where
the recording is indicative of some other behavior or plan, which is
criminal outside of the recording. The former criminalizes political
speech protected by the Constitution, whereas the latter falls within
the permissible use of the legal activity of recording to establish
probable cause or reasonable suspicion of some other non-videorecording crime. General and broad-reaching statutes such as the
wiretapping and privacy statutes are not enforceable or applicable
against the civilian recorder, and unnecessarily infringe on political
speech by criminalizing it. The Supreme Court has already held that
statutes that criminalize protected speech under the First Amend-

99
100

101
102
103

Id. at 243–46.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968) (“[T]he police should be allowed to ‘stop’ a person and detain him briefly for questioning upon suspicion that he may be connected with
criminal activity.”).
Id.
Id.
See Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 n.13 (1983) (“[I]nnocent behavior frequently will provide the
basis for a showing of probable cause.”); Terry, 392 U.S. at 1 (1968) (finding that an officer’s reasonable suspicion warranted an invasion of privacy).
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ment cannot stand.104 Narrowing the scope of the wiretapping and
privacy laws to exclude the civilian recorder remains true to the Supreme Court’s position that speech protected by the First Amendment cannot be criminalized.
There are, however, still narrow cases in which recording is not a
criminal offense but can be seen as evidence of some other criminal
activity. For example, when considering conspiracy and attempt
charges, a civilian-recorder who was attempting or conspiring to
commit an illegal act might, in his or her planning, video record the
area or people targeted. In this particular scenario, the people being
recorded would be on-duty police officers. While the act of video recording is not a crime, the purpose of the video and the use of it as
part of a criminal plan can provide evidence of a separate crime. The
act of recording when combined with other activities would be permissible evidence to provide support for probable cause and reasonable suspicion. The act of recording and the recorded image alone
would be insufficient to establish probable cause or reasonable suspicion without additional circumstances. At this time, a case of this nature has yet to arise and seems unlikely to arise. Instead, cases so far
have involved bypassers recording arrests.
While allowing the legal activity to be used as evidence of a crime
may have a chilling effect on protected speech, one that the Court
frequently seeks to avoid, the same can be said for all legal activity
that is considered in establishing the requisite Fourth Amendment
intrusions.
C. Reasonable Limitations: Time, Place, and Manner
As noted by the Eleventh Circuit, speech is generally capable of
content-neutral limitations based on time, place, and manner. Such
restrictions of protected speech are permissible if they are “narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest,” and leave open
105
Impermissible governalternative channels for communication.
ment purposes, such as the suppression of particular content or disagreement with the message, make the restrictions content-specific

104

105

See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (“[A]ny enforcement of a statute
thus placed at issue is totally forbidden until and unless a limiting construction or partial
invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression.”).
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). See also Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark for the same).

Oct. 2014]

NO CALLING CUT

307

and unconstitutional.106 For civilian recorders, these limitations can
be particularly important. Of special note in this situation is that the
time, place, and manner restrictions must be neutral to the content
of the speech, meaning that harsher restrictions cannot be imposed
on the civilian recorder over the civilian observer, as the presence of
a small recording device generally only makes the difference in creat107
ing a record. The following Parts consider (i) time restrictions and
(ii) place restrictions. Manner restrictions are not discussed in
depth, as the manner in this particular Comment is video record108
ing.
1.

Time Restrictions for the Civilian Recorder

Time restrictions may take two forms: (1) limitations to the precise day, minute, and hour; and (2) limitations on duration of recording. The first is impractical, as it would require the civilian recorder
to specifically know when events worthy of recording occur. The
most common situation for a civilian recorder is one mentioned at
the opening: an individual randomly observing a police interaction
or arrest and deciding to capture it on video. Prior planning is not
an option. Limitations on the amount of time spent recording are
more likely, although also constitutionally disturbing.
Under the Fourth Amendment, police officers are permitted to
not only follow every step an individual takes as long as it occurs in
public, but also use digital tracking devices such as beepers, even if
the officers lack probable cause. The Supreme Court readily dismissed these activities as intrusions of privacy because the public activities and travels were readily visible to anyone who wished to see
109
The court relied on the fact that travels were regularly obthem.
servable to anyone as a basis for saying that there is no privacy interest in activities conducted in public. Limiting the amount of time a
106

107

108
109

Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; see also Clark, 468 U.S. at 294 (“[E]xpression . . . may be forbidden
or regulated if the conduct itself may constitutionally be regulated, if the regulation is
narrowly drawn to further a substantial governmental interest, and if the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech.”).
Some will likely argue that the creation of a record is a significant variation. However, a
video record is only a more verifiable form of what is visually seen. It is easier to convey
to others, and limiting that speech is impermissible prior restraint, and based on the content of its message.
For considerations on alternative manners, such as note taking or plain observation and
their comparative inadequacies, see supra Part II(C).
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). But see United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,
961–63 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Fourth Amendment may limit
police from following an individual for extended periods of time without reason).
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civilian recorder can spend personally observing and documenting
the actions of police officers flies in the face of this reasoning. Members of the public do not have to shield their eyes from the publicly
accessible and readily viewable political actions of their government
when the government is not forced to shield its eyes from its citizen’s
public actions.
2. Place Restrictions for the Civilian Recorder
Place restrictions are a realistic consideration for the civilian recorder. Police officers have an important government interest in
maintaining the safety of those around them, including their own
safety as officers. They further have an important interest in maintaining crime scenes. All of these can impact the physical place a civilian recorder may be.
As explained in the right to gather information part of this Comment, there is no absolute right to access specific, restricted areas in
the interest of gathering information. Civilian recorders should be
limited in the same way as any other observers should be. No additional access should be granted, but no additional limitations should
be placed on the recorder. That is the best way to preserve speech
with reasonable content-neutral limitations.
Notable in place restrictions is the Supreme Court’s recent treatment of buffer zones against protesters at abortion clinics. The Supreme Court recently decided McCullen v. Coakley, a case questioning
110
a 35-foot buffer zone around all reproductive health care clinics.
McCullen, an anti-abortion protester, claimed the buffer zone violated her First Amendment rights, in part because she was too far displaced and unable to convey her messages to those entering the facil111
ities. The Court found the restrictions on location unconstitutional
because they “burden[ed] substantially more speech than necessary
112
The Court recognized that
to achieve the . . . asserted interests.”
moving protesters farther way was undoubtedly easier to protect pub113
Nevertheless,
lic safety and prevent harassment and intimidation.
the buffer was not narrowly tailored enough to address the valid concerns; instead, the government “must demonstrate that alternative

110
111
112
113

McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
Id. at 2535.
Id. at 2537.
Id. at 2540.
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measures that burden substantially less speech would fail to achieve
114
the government’s interests.”
For civilian recorders, the place restriction holds similar concerns.
While some concerns for safety may exist, an outright ban or an overly large distance restriction inhibits more speech than is necessary to
preserve safety. McCullen also suggests that removing a recorder so
far from the scene that nothing could be captured could be an infringement of First Amendment Rights. The permissible distance
varies based on the precise situation and government concerns. Thirty feet may be enough for observing and recording an arrest when
the arrestee was not resisting. Additional distance would be needed if
there were guns being waived. Individual evaluations on a case-bycase basis would be required.
D. Concerns for Officer Safety and Investigations
It is nearly impossible to consider the civilian recorder without
considering officer safety. It is a concern many have, noting the need
to protect our officers and preserve their investigative efforts. As a
hypothetical, imagine a civilian recorder who, after spending significant time recording officers in publicly accessible and visible places,
is able to discern the contents and strategy of an investigation. Revelation of the investigation to the public presents the possibility of ruining any potential results, and even causing physical harm to confidential informants. The initial reaction is to create such a limitation
whereby the recorder would not be permitted to obtain such information or convey it to others.
Such a response, however, contradicts well-established First
Amendment decisions and constitutes prior restraint. Indeed, “any
prior restraint on expression [has] a heavy presumption against its
115
In a per curium decision, the Supreme
constitutional validity.”
Court struck down an injunction prohibiting the New York Times from
publishing classified information entitled “History of U.S. Decision116
Making Process on Viet Nam Policy.” The U.S. Government argued
that publication of the information would endanger the United
117
States, and publication should be halted to ensure safety. Yet, the
court disagreed. Justice Hugo Black’s concurrence stated, “[t]he
114
115
116
117

Id.
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
Id. at 718 (Black, J., concurring).
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word ‘security’ is a broad, vague generality whose contours should
not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the
118
First Amendment.” Justice Potter Stewart, in his concurrence, noted the vast and occasionally unchecked powers of the executive before stating,
[i]n the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in
other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas of national defense and international
affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry—in an informed and critical
public opinion which alone can here protect the values of democratic
119
government.

He noted that some of the documents “should not, in the national
120
Yet, it was still short of the necessary “diinterest, be published.”
rect, immediate, and irreparable damage” needed to restrain the protected activity. If the First Amendment can protect the New York
Times and Washington Post in publishing the classified, strategic, executive decisions about the Vietnam War, because they were not considered dangerous enough, then there is no valid safety argument at
play with the citizen recorder either.
The limitation based on abstract considerations of safety, which
may or may not ever occur, is nothing more than prior restraint. In
the average recording of an arrest, there is no evidence that the video
recording will cause danger at the hands of the recorder or if the video is released. These concerns are unwarranted without a specific set
of facts that would indicate otherwise to the officer. Video recording
itself, the capturing of moving images, does not pose a safety concern. Acts done in conjunction with video recording or circumstances surrounding the video recording may, on a case- and fact-specific
basis, indicate otherwise. However, a total ban because the mere possibility that that someone watching too closely may cause harm at
some point in time is not enough to justify a ban on First Amendment protected speech for every person in America.
CONCLUSION
Civilian recorders have a First Amendment right to engage in video recording of their public officials, including police officers, while
they perform their duties in public. This right is not absolute, and no
right ever is. It has fine contours and will likely raise future constitu-

118
119
120

Id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring).
Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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tional questions. Yet, allowing recorders to be arrested for doing
nothing more than monitoring the actions of their government is to
penalize the public for remaining informed. A well-informed electorate is nothing but desirous, and recording assists in spreading that
knowledge and information. In conclusion, consider the evereloquent words of James Madison: “A popular Government, without
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue
to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever
govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own Gover121
nors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.”

121

Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).

